
Every modern military runs on an uncomfortable arithmetic: precision missiles take years to build, cost millions apiece, and get fired away in minutes — which means any sustained conflict eventually forces a choice between idle stockpiles and empty magazines. What acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told the Senate Armed Services Committee on November 17, 2026 was that the choice has already been made, and the Navy reached into munitions it had previously tagged as unserviceable to keep firing.
Key Points
- Hung Cao told senators the Navy “recoded” munitions marked Code Echo and Code Foxtrot — Defense Logistics Agency designations for unserviceable materiel — and fired them during Operation Epic Fury against Iran
- He compared the process to reviving stale bread with water and a microwave, a line that dominated coverage more than the technical substance behind it
- The Navy says Tomahawk production has climbed from roughly 125 missiles a year to more than 60 a month, though that pace may not match wartime burn rates
- Independent reporting and a CSIS analysis cited by Military Times estimate the U.S. expended between one-third and two-thirds of key munition inventories during the campaign
- A government watchdog found the Pentagon still lacks an overarching plan linking munitions production to actual requirements, a structural problem that predates this war
What Was Actually Said, and What It Means Technically
Cao’s exact words were specific and attributable: “A lot of the munitions we used in Epic Fury, we were able to recode those,” he told the committee, adding that they carried condition codes “Echo, Foxtrot, which means they’re expired”. This was not a leak or an anonymous Pentagon source — it was sworn testimony from the Navy’s senior civilian official, delivered during his own confirmation hearing, which gives the admission unusual weight. Under the Defense Logistics Agency’s materiel classification system, Echo and Foxtrot codes do not mean scrap; they mean unserviceable-but-potentially-repairable, a status distinct from a missile that has failed inspection outright and been condemned.
Recoding, in plain terms, means the Navy inspected or restored munitions that had fallen out of ready-for-issue status and reclassified them as usable before loading them aboard ship. That is a real and longstanding logistics practice, not an improvisation invented for this war. What remains genuinely unresolved is scope: Cao did not name the weapon systems involved, did not state how many rounds were recoded, and did not describe what testing or quality-assurance signoff preceded their use. The public record establishes that the practice occurred; it does not establish whether it touched a handful of missiles or a meaningful share of what the Navy fired.
The Bread Analogy and Why It Cuts Both Ways
Cao reached for a domestic image to explain a military logistics concept: bread “doesn’t expire,” he said, “you just rub some water on it, microwave for 15 seconds and it’s good to go.” The line traveled further than the testimony itself, anchoring headlines from Kyiv to Mumbai. It is a useful shorthand for the idea that an expiration date is a maintenance trigger, not a death sentence — pharmaceuticals past their printed date often retain potency, and the Stimson Center’s Kelly Grieco made exactly that comparison on the record. But the analogy also flattens a harder question: bread that fails to revive is merely inedible, while a cruise missile that fails to detonate or veers off course in flight does something categorically different. Reporting on a prior U.S. operation noted that some refurbished Tomahawks reportedly failed to explode and were later recovered intact — a precedent that argues for scrutiny of recoded munitions rather than reassurance.
Inventory Pressure Is Real, Even if the Scale Here Is Not Yet Known
Cao’s own numbers support the existence of a genuine supply problem without proving the stockpile is in crisis. He told the committee that Tomahawk output has risen from about 125 missiles annually in his earlier Navy career to more than 60 per month now, alongside efforts to expand SM-6 production and bring on additional ammunition manufacturers. That is substantial growth in factory throughput. Whether it is enough is a separate question the testimony does not answer: production figures say nothing about current stock levels, how fast missiles were consumed during the campaign, or how long it will take to rebuild to pre-war readiness. An analysis cited by Military Times, attributed to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, estimated the U.S. expended between one-third and two-thirds of key munition inventories during the 39-day campaign and its aftermath, which would strain even a fast-ramping production line.
A Structural Problem Older Than This War
This episode did not emerge in a vacuum. A Government Accountability Office review found the Pentagon still lacks an overarching plan connecting munitions production and funding to actual wartime requirements — a gap that predates Operation Epic Fury and reflects a decades-old shift in defense planning. Since the mid-1990s, the Department of Defense has moved away from maintaining surge capacity for a short, intense conflict and toward a leaner “come as you are” posture that assumes existing stocks and a smaller industrial base will suffice. That bet has been tested repeatedly since — by the Ukraine resupply effort, by Red Sea interceptor expenditure, and now by Iran — and each time it exposes the same seam: production lines can be expanded, but not instantly, and not without years of component-supplier investment. Recoding expired munitions is one visible symptom of that seam, not its cause, and it will keep recurring in future conflicts until the planning gap the GAO identified is actually closed.
What Would Resolve the Remaining Uncertainty
The honest limitation of this story is evidentiary, not rhetorical. No public document yet identifies which missile types were recoded, how many were fired, what inspection protocol preceded their use, or how they performed in combat. Congress has the tools to close that gap — committee exhibits, written answers for the record, Inspector General review of the recoding decisions — without compromising operational security on live targeting data. Until that happens, the fair reading of the evidence is narrow: the Navy used restored munitions under a documented classification system, inventory pressure is demonstrably real, and neither fact alone tells us whether this was routine sustainment or a symptom of something closer to depletion.
Sources:
zerohedge.com, finance.yahoo.com, thedailybeast.com, embed.businessinsider.com, cnbc.com, apnews.com






