Putin-Xi Cuba Move Stuns Washington

Russia and China are openly signaling that Cuba is their Western Hemisphere outpost—just as President Trump tightens the screws with an oil crackdown designed to deny the regime easy lifelines.

Story Snapshot

Putin and Xi used a February 2026 videoconference to reaffirm cooperation with Cuba and Venezuela despite U.S. pressure.
The Trump administration’s January 29 executive order barred the sale or supply of oil to Cuba, escalating leverage on Havana’s energy vulnerability.
Russia’s Cuba strategy has been described by analysts as largely symbolic, with limited capacity for major economic rescue due to Moscow’s constraints.
Russia and China are framing their coordination as part of a “multipolar” push that challenges U.S. influence in the Americas.
Cuba’s internal economic strain remains severe, increasing the odds Havana seeks talks while also courting outside patrons.

Putin and Xi Put Cuba on the Agenda as Trump Applies Energy Pressure

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a high-level videoconference in early February 2026 and publicly reaffirmed plans to maintain and expand cooperation with Cuba and Venezuela. The call landed after President Trump’s January 29 executive order prohibiting the sale or supply of oil to Cuba, a move aimed at pressuring the island’s government by targeting an obvious choke point. Russian officials later confirmed continued cooperation despite Washington’s threats and sanctions.

The messaging matters because it places Cuba inside a broader Russia-China narrative about resisting U.S. “unilateral actions.” In their public framing, Moscow and Beijing presented their partnership as a stable great-power alignment and announced work on a new comprehensive cooperation plan. At the same time, the available reporting does not show a detailed, near-term package that would offset an oil restriction at scale. The immediate impact appears to be diplomatic signaling rather than a clearly defined relief pipeline.

Why Cuba Still Matters to Moscow and Beijing—Even When the Payoff Is Limited

Analysts tracking Russia’s post-2022 foreign policy argue that Cuba’s value is often more political than economic. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the resulting Western sanctions, Havana remained a willing partner, giving Moscow a friendly flag in the region. Russia’s policy documents have listed Cuba among priority partners, and Moscow has explored mechanisms that reduce reliance on Western currencies, including ruble-based settlements and banking presence designed to keep transactions moving.

Russia also institutionalized the relationship by ratifying a military cooperation agreement with Cuba in October 2025, creating a formal framework for exchanges and security consultations. Even so, the research cautions that Russia’s capacity is constrained by its own economic limits and war-related pressures, meaning the benefits can remain largely rhetorical. That distinction—big geopolitical language versus narrow deliverables—helps explain why the partnership often looks louder than it is, even when it worries U.S. planners.

China’s Hemisphere Play: Trade Leverage and a “Multipolar” Message

China’s role differs from Russia’s: it has spent two decades expanding influence in Latin America through trade, investment, and infrastructure, offering governments alternatives to U.S.-centered economic ties. During the February exchange, Xi emphasized a turbulent international situation and urged joint responsibility for global strategic stability and a more balanced international order. China and Russia also highlighted the breadth of their own partnership, including large bilateral trade and cooperation in high-technology sectors.

Those broader ties allow Beijing to back Moscow politically without necessarily writing unlimited checks for Havana. The available reporting points to strategic coordination—especially on messaging and diplomatic alignment—more than a clear, public blueprint for how China would replace restricted energy flows into Cuba. For U.S. readers, the takeaway is straightforward: China can amplify the challenge by giving Russia cover and options, even if Cuba remains a limited economic prize in pure dollars-and-cents terms.

Venezuela Shockwaves and Cuba’s Economic Squeeze Raise the Stakes

The regional backdrop includes an extraordinary early-January event in Venezuela in which a military incursion reportedly resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro. Within that context, Russia and China’s explicit mention of both Cuba and Venezuela reads as an attempt to reassure allies and demonstrate that U.S. action in the region will meet coordinated pushback. Public statements described the Russia-China partnership as a model of great-power cooperation, tying Latin America into a bigger global contest.

Cuba, meanwhile, faces severe economic strain, with reporting describing the country as facing potential collapse and being forced into dialogue with the United States. That pressure point intersects directly with oil restrictions: energy shortfalls hit daily life, industry, and the government’s ability to maintain stability. The research also notes decades of sanctions and isolation that shaped Cuba’s dependency patterns. What remains unclear from the sources is how quickly outside partners can deliver practical relief.

What the U.S. Can and Cannot Prove About Moscow’s and Beijing’s Next Steps

The strongest, best-supported conclusion in the research is that Russia and China want Cuba to remain a symbol of defiance close to U.S. shores—and that they are willing to say so publicly. The weaker, less supported claim is that this automatically translates into large-scale material rescue. Analysts cited in the research explicitly separate rhetoric from practical action, arguing Moscow’s response may remain largely rhetorical. That gap is important for judging risk without slipping into speculation.

Russia, China, and the Cuban Chessboardhttps://t.co/0Powoj6TPA

— PJ Media (@PJMedia_com) February 11, 2026

For Americans wary of government overreach at home, the Cuba story is still a reminder that foreign policy mistakes and weakness invite adversaries to test boundaries abroad. The Trump administration’s oil restriction is a concrete tool aimed at leverage rather than open-ended nation-building, while Russia and China are using the moment to sell “multipolarity” and normalize an authoritarian alignment in the hemisphere. The next measurable indicator will be logistics—fuel, financing, and shipping—not speeches.